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Abstract:
This paper studies the e⁄ect of credit constraints and constraints on transfers
between parents and children, on di⁄erences in labor and schooling across children
within the same household, with an application to gender. When families are un-
constrained in these respects, di⁄erences in labor supply or education are driven by
di⁄erences in wages or returns to education. If the family faces an imperfect capital
market, the labor supply of each child is ine¢ cient, but di⁄erences across children
are still driven by comparative advantage. However, if interfamily transfers are con-
strained so that parents cannot o⁄set inequality between their children, they will
favor the human capital accumulation of the more disadvantaged child -generally the
one who works more as a child. We use our theory to examine the gender gap in
child labor. Using a sample of poor families in Colombia, we con￿rm our predictions
among rural households, although this is less clear for urban households. The gender
gap is largely explained by the wage gap between girls and boys. Moreover, fami-
lies with the potential to make capital transfers to adult children (e.g. those with
large animals), can compensate adult sons for their greater child labor and reduced
educational attainment. In such families, as predicted, the male/female labor gap is
greater.
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1 Introduction
Imperfect capital market and poverty combine to generate ine¢ ciently high lev-
els of child labor. Families facing imperfect capital markets cannot smooth their
consumption and respond by having their children work in order to increase cur-
rent consumption. Additionally, when parents do not leave positive transfers to their
adult children, the labor supply of each child is ine¢ ciently high. The last source of
ine¢ ciencies is generated by an agency problem because parents, who choose their
children￿ s time allocation, do not fully internalize the bene￿ts and costs of these de-
cisions when they cannot adjust intra-family transfers to or from their adult children
(Baland and Robinson, 2000).
While these e⁄ects are well established in the theoretical and empirical literature,
it is less clear how they in￿ uence the intrahousehold allocation of children￿ s time.
In particular, these models have not addresses the educational attainment and child
labor of boys and girls, despite evidence that girls and boys di⁄er in the incidence
of work activities (income-generating and domestic activities) and education, albeit
that the di⁄erence varies across countries3.
We study gender di⁄erences in time allocation among poor children. In particular,
we look at the e⁄ect of credit constraints and limited intrafamily transfers on gender
di⁄erences in labor supply and education. In the absence of such constraints di⁄er-
ences in labor supply and education are driven by children￿ s wages and the return
to schooling. We show that if the family faces imperfect capital markets, the labor
supply of each child is ine¢ cient but similar to the ￿rst best solution, in the sense
that di⁄erences across children within the household are still driven by wages and
the bene￿t of human capital accumulation. If parents do not leave transfers to their
children and cannot impose transfers from their adult children, the level of labor sup-
ply is ine¢ ciently high. Moreover, the family does not fully exploit the comparative
3Evidence on the gender gap in education and work activities has been reported by several
authors [see (Edmonds, 2007) for a complete survey]. In many cases girls are the unfavored members
within the household; for intance in Asian countries the gender gap in schooling against girls is
very signi￿cant (Bhatrola, 2007). However, in some Latin American countries such as Brazil and
Colombia, girls are the favored group within households in both schooling and income generating
activities (Guarcello et al, 2006).ChildLabor page 2
advantage of its children; instead, such families adjust child labor supply to reduce
the di⁄erences in adult outcomes among the children.
We test the theory using a sample of impoverished households in Colombia. In our
sample, girls get more education than boys do. This di⁄erence is explained mainly
by di⁄erences in wages, which also explain part of the gap in child labor. This is true
both for families that appear to have access to credit and those that do not. In rural
families with more animals, a likely source of intergenerational transfers, the gender
di⁄erences increase, as predicted by the theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the theory and its empirical implications. Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 shows some basic empirical results on the determinants of labor
supply. Section 6 shows how the gender gap changes with constraints. Finally in
section 7 we conclude.
2 Background and Related Literature
Child labor is usually a sign of extreme poverty and also reinforces the already
existing unfavorable conditions that working children face, with deep and sometimes
irreversible consequences for their future. Children work to contribute to their fam-
ilies￿resources, but this takes time away from school and other activities, which are
essential for the children￿ s development.
An enormous e⁄ort has been made to understand child labor (Edmonds, 2008).
The theory of child labor considers a wide range of determinants of school attendance
and child labor. From a human capital perspective (Becker, 1981), the child labor
decision depends on the relative net returns to di⁄erent child activities (education,
home production, formal labor tasks and play). The way such returns are perceived is
in￿ uenced by a number of factors. Poverty status, for instance, can alter the discount-
ing of future net bene￿ts of a child￿ s current actions. Credit market imperfections
may lead to an ine¢ ciently high level of child labor (Baland and Robinson, 2000).
The marginal return to each activity also depends on family structure or social norms.
For example, older children in the household are relatively more productive at formal
labor tasks than younger ones (Edmonds, 2006).
Additionally, children￿ s time allocation is a household decision which involves theChildLabor page 3
interaction of di⁄erent family members. Parents are central in the process, and the
costs and bene￿ts of the children￿ s actions are borne by each person within the house-
hold in a di⁄erent way. The ￿nal outcome may be the result of an intrahousehold
bargaining process (Basu, 2006). The parents￿inability to incorporate disutility of
labor for the child (Bommier and Dubois, 2004) or the di¢ culty of making commit-
ments that bind over generations (Udry, 2006) can again lead to ine¢ ciencies.
Moreover, there are persistent systematic di⁄erences between boys and girls in
school attendance, domestic work, and ￿elds of work outside the house, but there are
still few studies focusing on gender di⁄erences.
Our paper is related to three branches of the literature. The ￿rst is the unitary
model of household resource allocation among members within a household. This
literature shows that in a static model households can achieve e¢ cient decisions re-
garding human resource allocation if parents are not restricted from leaving transfers
to their children (Becker and Tomes, 1986). However, if parents are not wealthy
enough to leave positive transfers to their children, households may reinforce or com-
pensate di⁄erences in outcomes created by di⁄erences in human capital formation
(Berhman et al, 1995). We extend this literature by endogenizing the labor supply of
children.
The second branch of literature concerns the determinants of child labor (e.g.
Baland and Robinson, 2000). The paper closest to ours, Horowitz and Wang (2004)
considers families with heterogeneous children and shows that families cannot exploit
the comparative advantage of their children when parents do not leave positive be-
quests to their children. Our work di⁄ers from Horowitz and Wang in two dimensions.
First, we also look at credit constraints. Second, we test our theoretical predictions
with data on poor families in Colombia.
Finally, since our data set provides information on who is the decision-maker, we
address decisions in households with more than one member. If mothers get more
disutility from child labor, then according to the intrahousehold bargaining model,
the higher the power of the father within the household, the higher the level of labor
supply of the children. In addition, if parents place more utility weight on children
of their own sex, we predict outcomes will depend on the distribution of bargaining
power. We do ￿nd a large di⁄erential e⁄ect of sex of the decision-maker on girls, but
it does not explain the observed gap in education or labor participation.ChildLabor page 4
3 Theory
In this section we provide a simple theoretical set-up in order derive our empirical
predictions about gender di⁄erences in child labor.
Each household is composed of an adult (or a set of adults with similar preferences
whom we call parents) and two children (i = 1;2)4. The decision maker chooses the
child￿ s labor supply (li). Each child lives for two periods. During the ￿rst period,
each child i has one unit of time to be distributed between labor and schooling . In
the second period, each adult child has earnings that depend on ￿rst period schooling.
The children may di⁄er on two dimensions, returns to education and wages. When
child i spends li time on work activities she/he earns wili in the ￿rst period, where wi
is the wage of the child. The labor supply of the child in the ￿rst period a⁄ects the
earnings of the child in the second period h(1 ￿ li;ei). This function h(:) is strictly
increasing and concave in 1 ￿ li. Parameter ei a⁄ects how much is learned in school.




The household lives two periods and individuals do not discount. For the ￿rst
period, the entire family is treated as a single consumption unit and its total con-
sumption is denoted by cf. In the second period, there are three di⁄erent consumption
units, as the parents and the children each go their own way. We denote ci as the
adulthood consumption of adult child i and cp as the parent￿ s consumption during
period 2. Parents take into account family utility in both periods and the weight
of child i￿ s utility on their welfare. Formally the objective function of parents (fam-
ily) is W = Uf(cf) + Up(cp) +
P2
i=1 ￿iVi(ci). The functions Uj(cj);8j = f;p and
Vi(ci);8i = 1;2 are increasing and concave5. The weight of child i￿ s welfare on the
parents utility is captured by the altruism parameter ￿i 2 (0;1);8i = 1;2.
During the ￿rst period, family consumption, cf, is equal to the parents￿income
A (exogenous), plus the labor income of each child wili, less savings s, cf = A +
4This paper considers fertility as exogenous. Baland and Robinson(2000) considers child labor
with endogenous fertility.
5We assume that children￿ s labor does not enter directly on the utility of parents. Bommier and
Dubois (2004) considers disutility of child labor in the utility function of parent. By introducing
disutility they found additional ine¢ ciencies on the level of child labor, in the sense that even if the
family is unconstrained the levels of labor supply of children are ine¢ cient.ChildLabor page 5
P2
i=1 wili ￿ s. In the second period, parents￿consumption, cp, is equal to parents
income A, plus savings, less transfers that parents leave to each child bi(transfers can
be interpreted as bequest), cp = A+s￿
P2
i=1 bi. In addition, the consumption of each
child ci is equal to the market value of her/his human capital formation h(1 ￿ li;ei)
plus parents￿transfers bi, ci = h(1 ￿ li;ei) + bi 8i = 1;2.
Parents maximize the welfare of the household subject to the budget constraints
and, possibly to credit (s ￿ 0) and bequest constraints (bi ￿ 0). We assume that
parents choose interior solutions for the labor supply of each child. Then, the ￿rst




















+ ￿i; 8i = 1;2
￿s = 0
￿ ￿ 0
￿ibi = 0; 8i = 1;2
￿i ￿ 0; 8i = 1;2
From the general ￿rst order conditions we can analyze di⁄erent special cases. The
￿rst case considers households under perfect capital markets (no credit constraints)
and with enough assets to leave transfers to their children (no bequest constraints).
This case gives the Pareto e¢ cient outcome, which implies that parents should choose
each child￿ s labor supply such that the marginal wage increase from schooling is equal
to the wage (the marginal cost of reducing labor supply). Formally, it implies that




= wi, 8i = 1;2 (2)
6The multipliers have the standard interpretations. For instance ￿ represents the in￿nitesimal
gains on optimal welfare (utility) of the family when its credit restriction is reduced in￿nitesimal. In
the same way, ￿i represents the in￿nitesimal gains on the optimal level of utility when the familiy
has an additional unit of assets to leave transfers to their child i.ChildLabor page 6
The interpretation of condition (1) is standard: the family bene￿t of sending child
i to work is the current wage earned by this child, and the cost of child labor is the
lower future earnings of the child. In households where perfect capital markets allow
smooth consumption and there are no issues of "agency" (positive bequests allow
parents to internalize the future costs of child labor), parents, even if poor, borrow
to ￿nance their children￿ s education, con￿dent in their ability to repay the loan out
of the increased earnings of their adult children.
Equation (1) implies that among families for whom the credit and bequest con-
straints are not binding, only the return to education and wages as a child explain
any di⁄erences across children. Empirically, it says that variables that do not explain
the return to education or wages should not explain education or child labor. In
other words, when we consider unconstrained households and apply the model to the
gender gap, any observed gap in education and labor supply should disappear after
controlling for these two variables.
The second special case considers a household for whom optimal savings is negative
and cannot borrow to ￿nance the children￿ s education. In this situation the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier on the savings constraint is positive (￿ > 0). However, the family
does not face "agency" problems in the sense that the other constraints are not binding









> wi, 8i = 1;27 (3)
Equation (2) states that parents who are unable to smoothly transfer income from the
future into the present by borrowing, will choose an ine¢ ciently high level of child
labor since the marginal utility of future consumption is less than that of current
consumption and therefore the marginal return to human capital acquisition is greater
than current wages in equilibrium. However, since the ratio of marginal utilities of the
household is constant within households, the di⁄erence between boys and girls within
families should not be explained by any factors that do not a⁄ect relative wages or
relative returns to education.
Now we study the case when parents are not able to leave transfers to their children
("agency" problem). Savings are interior (￿ = 0 ). In this case ￿i > 0. Parents choose
7We denote the levels of variables under credit constraints with "cc".ChildLabor page 7










> wi, 8i = 1;28 (4)
which from the third ￿rst order condition implies that lbc
i > l￿
i. Intuitively we can
observe that with positive transfers, parents have two instruments to achieve a certain
level of welfare for their children: the amount of child labor and transfers. When
parents care about their children￿ s welfare and plan to leave positive transfers, they
ensure that the child￿ s labor is e¢ cient. Parents can compensate the reduction in the
income earned by their children by saving less and reducing transfers (transferring
from period 2 into current consumption at period 1). However, for parents whose
optimal bequest is negative and thus cannot be reduced, child labor will be ine¢ ciently
high and schooling attendance too low, as child labor is the only instrument available
to transfer resources from the younger generation to the older generation. Therefore,
even when capital markets operate perfectly smoothly (at least within generations)
and parents are altruistic towards their children, agency problems can induce too
much child labor and too little investment in education. The source of the problem is
that poor parents who would require transfers from their future adult children, in the
unconstrained optimum, instead use child labor to support the current consumption
of the household while allowing themselves to save more for their old age.
Additionally, equation (3) says that there will be more of a distortion in the ￿rst
order condition if the child is less valued (￿i is lower) or the child￿ s future consumption
is higher. Although we would need conditions on the curvature of the human capital
accumulation function to prove a formal theorem regarding the distortion of education
levels, this suggests that the education level of the child with the higher wage/lower
future wage will be distorted less. Comparing each child to his or her own ￿rst best
level (unconstrained situation), the lower the ￿i and the marginal utility of consump-
tion in adulthood, the higher the distortion of the constrained optimal level from the
￿rst best. As consumption tomorrow is linked to the level of human capital accumula-
tion, the child with the higher wage today would tend to have higher marginal utility
of consumption tomorrow and therefore the distortion for this child will be less. As
the increase of labor (compared to the ￿rst best level) is higher for the non-working
child, the gap between siblings is smaller for transfer-constrained-families.
8We denote the level of variables under bequest constraints with "bc".ChildLabor page 8
Applying this reasoning to the gender gap, we anticipate that because boys work
more, on average, their labor participation rate will be distorted less. Families with
the potential to make capital transfers to adult children (for example, transferring
animals or the farm to their son), can compensate adult sons for their greater child
labor and increase their labor force participation. Therefore, the gender labor force
participation gap should be smaller in families in which the non-negative bequest
constraint is binding. This is in line with the prediction of Horwitz and Wang (2004).
The conclusion of di⁄erent intrafamily transfers relates to the work of Botticini
and Siow (2003). They analyze the intrafamily transfer incentive in virilocal societies
with an application from a premodern economy (early Renaissance Tuscany). In this
context, families pay higher dowries for their daughters to increase the chances of her
getting married and tranfes consumption to her, and leave bequest to their son, who
would stay at home and ￿have a comparative advantage in working with the family
assets relative to their married sister.￿ In our model, although we do not explore
the e⁄ect of marriage market, it can play a role in de￿ning the way parents choose
their time allocation decision of their children, and both human capital accumulation
and home skills can be a way to increase the chances for her daughter to ￿nd a
good marriage. Nevertheless, the e⁄ect of wages should permanently a⁄ect the choice
between schooling and work, rather than home activities.
Summing up, the model presented implies that there should be a gender gap
in child labor among unconstrained households only if children￿ s wages and future
returns on human capital di⁄er by gender; otherwise children are equal. In the case
of capital market imperfection, the labor supply of children is ine¢ cient but the
gender gap is determined by the same set of variables as in the unrestricted case.
4 Data
In order to test the main theoretical results, we look at poor families in Familias en
Accion, a social program implemented in Colombia in 2002. Families in the program
were given subsidies, conditional upon school attendance of older children (7 and
above) and on nutrition and health check-ups for younger ones. Although the purpose
of the survey was mainly to evaluate the subsidy program, it also o⁄ers very rich
information about the families￿characteristics, decision process and expectations,
allowing us to obtain insights about child labor decisions and family economics inChildLabor page 9
general.
We use the base line survey, for which 11;462 households (68;609 individuals)
were interviewed. The survey collected information on household living arrangements,
economic conditions such as income, assets, transfers to and from the household, de-
tailed family expenditures, external shocks and how the family responded ￿nancially
to these shocks. Women respondents were asked who makes such decisions as whether
the child goes to school if the child does not want to. For individuals 10 and older,
there is rich information on education and employment history, type and amount of
payments, work arrangements and conditions, time allocation per day, and expected
and desired years of schooling.
We focus therefore on the time allocation of children 10 to 17 years old at the
time of the ￿rst survey. Our sample consists of 16;615 children of whom 47:11% are
female9. Of these, 6% of boys and 5:5% of girls are only children, and 18% of boys
and 15% of girls live with children of the same gender. The remaining sample consists
of households with at least one child of each sex.
The survey was designed to evaluate the program Familias en Accion. In order
to be eligible, families had to be in an eligible municipality. Such municipalities
were required to have a population less than 100,000, access to basic education and
health services, a bank, and the local authority had to register the municipality
in the program. In addition, the municipalities could not be located in the co⁄ee
region. Within each town, families registered with SISBEN (System for the Selection
of Bene￿ciaries of Social Programs) were eligible to receive bene￿ts. The survey is
based on municipalities registered in the program (a random and strati￿ed selection
of 50). These municipalities were matched with a control group based on geographic
location, population, and indices of quality of life, and school and health structure
availability. Most of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health
infrastructure but without a bank. There were also a few towns chosen to match
relatively large municipalities (just over 100;000 inhabitants). Families were chosen
at random from eligible families (or potentially eligible in control communities).
Although the survey has households in urban and rural areas, it covers mostly
small municipalities -64% of the sample lives in municipalities with less than 14;000
inhabitants. Preliminary analysis reveals that treatment and controls were not well
9Age distribution is presented in the AppendixChildLabor page 10
matched -at least in terms of our variables of interest, i.e. gender di⁄erences in time
allocation. We therefore ignore the treatment/control distinction and analyze the
sample in its entirely. Overall, we have then a sample of poor families in small towns
in Colombia, not living in the co⁄ee region.
For working children, we construct a measure of hourly income from work activities
(reported wage, independent work income and other kinds of work). For children
with no monthly income we have the average hourly wage of his/her gender in the
municipality and zero if there is no child worker of his/her gender in the municipality
and a dummy indicating that. We are aware that this is not quite a precise measure
for those who are not working, since their non-observable wages are probably lower.
However, if the latent wages for our non-working boys compared to the ones that work
is close to the relative wages for girls (non-working versus working), the measure of
the wage gap should be not problematic. Nevertheless, our sample of working boys
is much bigger than that of girls. If working children face higher wages, this sample
for girls would tend to be drawn from the upper tail of the wage distribution, relative
to boys. In that case, we would be underestimating the gender wage di⁄erence for
children and therefore its e⁄ect on the time allocation di⁄erentials.
5 Descriptive Analysis
Our main interest is in school attendance and labor force participation. Given
that usually a high percentage of girls are involved in domestic duties at home, we
also take that activity into consideration in our analysis.
We look at the entire population of children as well as analyzing younger (10-13)
and older children (14-17) separately, and divide the sample by urban/rural munic-
ipalities. Weighted means are presented in Table 1. The ￿rst panel presents the
percentage of children involved in each activity while the second one shows the inten-
sity of hours for each activity.
A child is considered working if the day before the interview she spent some time
working outside the house or in a family business, or if the information about last year
indicates that she was involved in such activities (major task was paid job and/or the
child has worked during the last year). Domestic activities at home are constructed
as a dummy variable indicating whether a child was involved in household duties forChildLabor page 11
two hours or more the day before the interview.
The labor force participation rate among children 10 to 17 years of age in our
sample is 24%, and 50% of children are involved in either labor activities or domestic
duties. As children grow older, the level of labor force participation doubles (from 13%
to 36%). Boys labor force participation goes from 19% to 51% while their domestic
activities remain at 20%. For girls, participation in the labor market goes from 7%
to 19% and domestic activities increase from 36% to 52%. The decrease in school
attendance for boys is almost the same as the increase in labor participation rate.
For girls, the decrease in education is the same as the increase in both domestic and
labor activities. Overall nevertheless, the gap in education favors girls when they
grow older. For those age 10 to 13, the gender di⁄erence is 3.3 percentage points
while for those 14 to 17, it is 12 percentage points.
We would think that education is more compatible with domestic duties than with
other work, but changes in activities as children age suggest substitutability between
both labor market and domestic duties and schooling, at least for girls. Changes in
educational attendance and labor participation as children grow older are larger in
rural areas. The urban/rural di⁄erence in schooling among 10 to 13 year olds is only
4 percentage points for boys (89% for urban and 85% for rural), and 6 percentage
points for girls (94% of urban young girls and 88% in rural areas), but rises to 13
percentage points for older boys (62% urban and 49% rural) and 18 percentage points
(76% urban and 58% rural) for girls. For younger girls, there is also not much of an
urban/rural di⁄erence in labor participation (6% and 7%) and domestic duties (34%
for urban girls and 38% in rural areas). In the case of younger boys, the urban/rural
gap in terms of work is greater (11 percentage points di⁄erence). For older children,
there is an urban/rural di⁄erence in the labor participation rate of 16 percentage
points for boys (42% for urban and 58% for rural), and only 4 percentage point for
girls (17% and 21%).
The lower panel of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the hours children
were involved in each activity the day before the interview. On average, children
spent 2.7 hours a day in school activities, less than one hour (0.9) working and about
an hour in domestic duties. The general picture in terms of di⁄erences across groups
(gender, age and urban/rural) is very similar to that based on participation rates. As
they grow older, boys spend much more time working (1.5 hours more for the whole
sample), and less time studying (1 hour less). The girls also reduce their study time,ChildLabor page 12
by 52 min (0.86 hrs), and increase both their time working and time in domestic
duties, but by less than the increase for boys. The increase in the time spent on
non-school activities is higher than the decrease in the hours spent in school or doing
homework, especially for males. Boys spend 2.15 hours working when they grow older
compared to 0.62 for the younger sample. For this group, school time drops from 2.95
hrs to 1.97. And again, rural boys have a much higher change, as the older group
works almost 2 hours more than the younger one.
Participation rates and intensity show us that girls go to school more, even when
young, and as children grow older, boys go to work and girls go to work or stay at
home helping with household chores. Overall, boys are involved in more non-school
activities, and that is re￿ ected in the increased gap in education in favor of girls.
Table 2 provides some basic descriptive statistics for boys and girls. Girls work
less but among those for whom the major activity is work, "hours worked during the
week" is higher than among working boys (41 versus 38), and the average wage is
lower. The literacy rate is slightly higher for females (94% versus 92%). The same
table also shows the reason given for not going to school by the drop-outs in our
sample. The three most important variables, are the ones that show higher gender
di⁄erences as well. Costs seem to be the main factor (for 65% of girls and 56% of
boys). Motivation is the second reason, with big di⁄erences between boys and girls;
40% of males said they did not like studying compared with 20% of female drop-outs.
Work is the third reason, for 23% of boys and 13% of girls. Household duties are
important as well, but there is no gender di⁄erence (18% for both groups).
In Table 3 we look at the occupations of working children. The ￿rst panel shows
the distribution of the main activity among children who have worked at some point in
their lives. The percentage of boys and girls for whom the major activity is studying
is quite similar (29% for boys and 31% for girls). Boys tend to work more (45%
vs 28% of girls) and a higher proportion of girls from this group perform household
duties as their main activity (35% vs 8% of boys).
For those whose main activity the week before the interview was work or who did
not work but had a job, we have their activities and place of work. The second panel
of Table 3 shows that 60% of working boys classi￿ed themselves as employees, 20%
as self-employed and 20% as family workers with no pay. Girls on the other hand
are mostly either employees or maids (around 40% each). The third panel shows the
place of work. Most boys are involved in agricultural tasks; for 73% the place ofChildLabor page 13
work is a farm (family or non-family). In rural areas, this percentage goes up to 91%,
compared with 38% for urban boys. In urban areas, 20% of boys are employed in
an o¢ ce and 18% work on the streets. Urban girls work mostly at somebody else￿ s
house (60%) or in a store or o¢ ce (19%). A higher proportion of rural girls work on
non-family farms (24%) and 45% work as maids.
The last panel of Table 3 shows the reasons for missing school for those who did
not attend for at least one day during the last month before the interview, but were
still registered in school. Work activities are not an important factor for missing
school. The main reason is sickness and there is some gender di⁄erence again in
motivation: 11% of boys did not want to go versus 7% of girls.
6 Characteristics of Household and Gender Com-
position
The di⁄erences between boys and girls in terms of schooling and labor participa-
tion rate, controlling only for age are presented in the ￿rst panel of Table 4. This
table captures the main aspects of the descriptive statistics presented in detail in the
section above. Once we take age into account, girls have a 7 percentage point higher
school attendance rate than do boys. In urban areas the di⁄erence is 9 percentage
points and for rural children 5 percentage points. The main di⁄erence is among older
urban children, with a raw gap of 14 percentage points in favor of girls. In terms
of work participation, there is a di⁄erence of 21 percentage points. Older rural chil-
dren show the biggest gender di⁄erences (37 percentage points). In urban areas, the
labor gap goes from 9 percentage points among younger children, to 24 percentage
points for the 14-17 year old sample. Finally, the last row of Table 4 presents the
gap for household duties. Girls perform domestic tasks at home more frequently (23
percentage points). The gap is higher for older children in rural areas (37 percentage
points).
We explore the general determinants of child labor typically addressed by the
literature, and analyze possible e⁄ects on the gender gap. The theory framework tells
us that, in principle, the main di⁄erence between boys and girls is driven by the wages
children face and their return to education.
Although we chose an unitary model to understand the main forces that driveChildLabor page 14
the time allocation di⁄erences of poor children, a growing part of the literature ex-
plores the possibility of intrahousehold mechanisms as additional sources of the gap
in schooling and work for boys and girls. From this point of view, gender di⁄erences
on economic conditions, parent￿ s education, family structure and birth order, or bar-
gaining mechanisms within the household, might a⁄ect the level of child labor supply
and the gap between a boy and a girl. This section not only connects our analysis
with the existing literature on the determinants of child education and labor, but also
explores additional elements that our model might not capture.
Although the characteristics considered in this section do not enter into the model
explicitly, some of them are present. According to our framework, education of parents
for instance, since it a⁄ects family income, can have a positive e⁄ect on children￿ s
educational attainment and a negative e⁄ect on the labor supply. Parents education
can have an e⁄ect on the time allocation of their children if a marginal change would
bring family income below a minimum threshold for which the time of their children
would be allocated e¢ ciently. The theoretical e⁄ect on the gender gap is not straight
forward. If parents￿education is closely correlated to family access to credit, it would
have no e⁄ect on the gender di⁄erence. On the other hand, if having a more educated
parent means higher future transfers to their children, more educated parents would
have a wider labor gap between their children.
Our ￿rst speci￿cation analyzes the gender gap for school attendance, labor market
participation and domestic work, using a linear regression controlling for a wide set
of measures of household and child characteristics.
Di⁄erent groups of controls are considered in our general estimation: location of
the household (rural/urban, region dummies, if family is in the subsidy program or
not), house characteristics (roof, ￿ oor and wall materials; whether it has electricity,
running water, sewage, garbage system and refrigerator; if family owns or rents,
number of rooms), household structure (number of families sharing cooking facilities,
number of children 0 to 6 years old, and 7 to 17 years old, number of male and
female adults, age, education and main activity of head of household and his/her
partner), family roles and interaction (if mother is involved in participation groups
and her leadership role; how the decisions about her children￿ s schooling and about
the money she earns are made: by her alone, her partner alone, both together or
somebody else), and family shocks in the last 3 years (indicating if household faced
sickness of a family member, loss of harvest, loss in a family business, ￿re, ￿ oods,ChildLabor page 15
and/or violence). For this speci￿cation we do not include pooled income of adults in
the household and use mainly household characteristics as a proxy.
As shown in the second panel of Table 4, including this set of controls explains
almost none of the gender gap in any of the three activities we are considering; the
estimated gap is very close to the raw gap. Most of the controls in this speci￿cation
are at the family level, and gender of children is mostly random. We have nevertheless
some information about the possible determinants of schooling and child labor. Table
4a presents the coe¢ cients for some of the controls included in the speci￿cation,
dividing the sample into rural and urban areas, and by age group.
There are some variables that a⁄ect children￿ s school attandance consistently
across age and area of location. All regional dummies are signi￿cant. Proxies for
family economic status, such as having a refrigerator or the education level of the
head of the household, have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on school attendance for
both urban and rural children. For the entire population, the e⁄ects of the education
of the head of the family and his/her partner (hereafter, wife or mother) are similar,
although the e⁄ect of the head￿ s education tends to be more statistically signi￿cant.
Another variable that has a very strong correlation with schooling is the number of
children 0 to 6 years of age within the household, with a stronger relation in rural
areas. Over the whole sample, on average, having an additional little child at home
increases the chance of quitting school by 3 percentage points. The e⁄ect for older
children and for the rural sample is higher. Having a member in the family sick in
the last three years a⁄ects children￿ s school attendance negatively. Surprisingly, if
the household had a ￿re in the last three years, children go to school more.
Additionally, if the mother makes the decision when the children do not want to go
to school, children tend to go to school more than if it is the father or somebody else
makes the decision. This is the case for older children in urban areas and younger
ones in rural. This is consistent with the idea that conditional subsidies targeting
children should be given through the mother.
Table 4b presents estimates separately for boys and girls in order to determine
whether they are a⁄ected di⁄erently by household￿ s characteristics. Mother￿ s educa-
tion has a more clearly positive e⁄ect on boys than on girls, while with respect to the
education of the head of the household, the reverse is true.
Family structure has a di⁄erent correlation with schooling for boys and girls. WithChildLabor page 16
respect to the number of small children, we divided the variable into two: children 0
to 3 years of age and children 4 to 6 years old. For the whole population, the number
of children 0 to 3 years of age in the household has a similar e⁄ect for boys and girls.
The correlation between schooling and family structure is very similar between boys
and girls for the younger group. For children 14 and older, the number of children has
a larger e⁄ect on girls, and the opposite happens when we look at children 4 to 6 years
of age. However, neither of these e⁄ects is statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent between
genders. The number of female adults has a positive impact on boys, especially the
older group, and none for girls. Finally, if a person in the household is sick, for the
whole group the e⁄ect is negative and signi￿cant for both boys and girls, but the
coe¢ cient for older girls is larger (-0.104 versus -0.049 for boys).
There is also a large di⁄erential e⁄ect of mother￿ s decision making on girls￿edu-
cation. Having the mother or both parents together decide whether the child goes to
school if she/he does not want to, increases the school attendance of girls, while it
does not have an e⁄ect on boys.
We estimated the same speci￿cations for labor participation and domestic duties
at home (not shown). For both activities, especially for domestic duties, the coe¢ -
cients are generally insigni￿cant. The one variable that remains signi￿cant for labor
force participation is the number of children in the household. As for schooling, the
e⁄ect of small children (0 to 3) is signi￿cant and in the case of labor participation,
positive, with no di⁄erences in the magnitude of the coe¢ cients across genders. For
domestic duties, on the other hand, the number of children does not have any e⁄ect
on boys but has a mixed e⁄ect for girls. The coe¢ cient on the number of children is
negative and insigni￿cant at the 0.01 level for 0 to 3 year old children, and positive
and signi￿cant for 4 to 6 year old children.
This section explores possible determinants of child labor. After controlling for
family structure, location of household, house characteristics and family decision
process, a signi￿cant di⁄erence between boys and girls remains. Even more, these
covariates do not help us by much in reducing the observed initial di⁄erences. In line
with theory, we ￿nd that characteristics that do not a⁄ect wages or future returns to
education do not explain the gender gap in time allocation.ChildLabor page 17
7 Gender Di⁄erences in Time Allocation and
Changes of the Gap
The theory framework states that for poor families both the returns to work
(wages) and its marginal cost (foregone human capital accumulation) drive most of
the di⁄erences in children￿ s activities (equation 1). Empirically, it says that variables
that do not explain the returns to education or wages should not explain gender
di⁄erences. In that sense, our results in the previous section are consistent with the
theory. However, this is a weak test. Since the gender of children is quite random, we
do not expect that variables such as household structure or father￿ s education, will
be strongly correlated with gender. Therefore such variables should not explain any
part of such di⁄erences. Aditionaly, we do not ￿nd di⁄erent coe¢ cients by gender,
which is a stronger result.
We therefore ask whether accounting for wages of the child reduces the gender
gap noticeably.
7.1 Role of the Wages
In the absence of constraints on borrowing and transfers, wages would explain a
major part of the gender di⁄erential on child labor. The other part should be due to
di⁄erences in the marginal returns to education, although we present some evidence
below that leads us to believe that future returns to human capital accumulation are
not strongly related to gender.
Families are asked in the ￿rst evaluation survey two years after the base line was
collected, about their estimate of how much their oldest child could earn with and
without a high school diploma. Parents whose oldest child is a boy believe that having
a high school degree would give him an average of 154;415 pesos more per month
(around 64 dollars at the time), with a standard deviation of 99;438. The average
di⁄erence for girls is almost exactly the same (a di⁄erence of 1;100 pesos, or less than
50 cents). This certainly does not establish that the return to schooling is equal for
boys and girls at all levels of education, but to some extent it suggests a limited role
for this variable in explaining gender di⁄erences in time allocation. While we will not
necessarily expect wages to completely eliminate the gender gap for unconstrained
households, they should substantially reduce it.ChildLabor page 18
Table 5 presents the results of the estimated gap in schooling and work for a
variety of speci￿cations. The information for each activity is divided into two panels.
The ￿rst one is a dichotomous variable (whether the child is involved in that activity
or not) and the second one is a continuous variable (hours spent on each activity the
day before the interview). The results are consistent for the two types of variables.
The ￿rst row in each panel shows the raw gap controlling only for age. The
coe¢ cient is shown separately for younger (10-13) and older (14-17) children and by
urban/rural status. We begin by looking at the male/female schooling gap controlling
only for wages. The results are shown in the third row of each panel. Comparing
the third and ￿rst rows, we see that wages account for much of the gender gap in
schooling.
The overall gap in school participation falls from 7.0 percentage points to a still
statistically signi￿cant 2.5 percentage points. The reduction in rural areas is much
more notable (from 4.8 percentage points to 0.8 overall) than in urban areas (from 8.7
to 4.8 percentage points). In urban areas, the remaining gap is statistically signi￿cant
and, at least for older children, large. All di⁄erences in school attendance rates are
statistically insigni￿cant in rural areas once we control for wages. When we look
at hours spent studying the day before the interview, the e⁄ect of wages is much
stronger. The gender di⁄erences become smaller and insigni￿cant across all groups.
The reduction of the estimated gap in terms of work participation is in the same
direction as that of schooling. Nevertheless, the percentage point change in the gap
is higher by 2 or 3 percentage points across all groups for work participation than
for school attendance. However, considering the gap change in percentage terms, the
decrease is much higher for education, as the gap in work participation is higher. For
the whole population, for instance, the gender gap in schooling is reduced by 64%,
while for work participation, it is reduced by 37%.
The largest change when we include wages is for older children in rural areas (from
-0.37 to -0.25). For older urban children, the gap goes from -0.24 to -0.16. In rural
areas, while the change in education is very strong (83% for the whole sample), the
variation in work is around 32%.
Overall, these results ￿t the model prediction; wages account for much of the
gender gap in child labor and schooling.
Our theory framework, additionally, gives predictions for the gender di⁄erencesChildLabor page 19
as families face credit constraints. If there are credit constraints but no restrictions
on intergenerational transfers, the marginal cost of child labor is equal to the wage,
multiplied by the ratio of marginal utility of consumption of the household today
and the parents tomorrow (equation 2). As the ratio of marginal utilities is constant
within a household, the result with unconstrained families, gender di⁄erences should
be explained by wages and the return to education, should hold within families.
The second and fourth row of each panel in Table 5 therefore considers family
￿xed e⁄ects. For education participation, the gender gap of the family ￿xed e⁄ect
speci￿cation with no wage as control (second row of each panel) is lower than the
raw gap for most of the groups. For all but rural younger children, the ￿xed e⁄ect
gender coe¢ cient is about 80% of the gender di⁄erences with no controls. For hours
of school activities the day before the interview, the ￿xed e⁄ect gap is smaller for
urban children and bigger in rural areas. For work participation, the gap in the ￿xed
e⁄ect model is much closer to the raw gap (in terms of percentage). For hours worked,
on the other hand, the ￿xed e⁄ect gap is higher, especially in rural areas. Older rural
boys for instance, work 2.4 hours more than girls in the samer age group, compared
to a 1.9 di⁄erence in the raw speci￿cation.
These disparities between the family ￿xed e⁄ect model and the raw gap with no
controls, show a di⁄erence in the gender gap between children of families with same
sex children, or an only child, and the gender gap for families with a gender mix. It is
unclear at this point if this is because the decision process for the "same-sex" families
favors girls or boys or because one group is more disadvantaged than the other, and
that is re￿ ected in the time allocation of their children.
Moving to the ￿xed e⁄ect model with wages included, the prediction for the role
of this covariate is analogous to that when we exclude ￿xed e⁄ects. Even if families
face credit constraints, the ratio of the marginal cost of labor is equal to the ratio
of marginal bene￿ts (the wages). For school participation, the estimated gap once
we consider family ￿xed e⁄ects and wages is very close to the speci￿cation with just
wages. For the entire sample, the di⁄erence in school participation is 2.9 percentage
points, still statistically signi￿cant. In urban areas, the gap is smaller than in the
third row; the di⁄erence for older children drops to 6.8 percentage points, signi￿cant
at the 5% level. For rural children, on the other hand, the estimated gap is higher
than in the third row and, for older children, close to the gap found for urban children.
However, there is also no statistical di⁄erence in hours of school for any group.ChildLabor page 20
Overall, this section presents strong evidence that children￿ s wages can explain
much of the gender gap in education, consistent with the theory. This suggests that
other elements such as family structure or within household bargaining are marginal
at least in explaining educational attendance di⁄erences for our Colombian sample.
The explanatory power is not as strong for labor force participation and work intensity
di⁄erentials. This may be due, in part, to the informality of some of the work the
children are engaged in. Children are involved in a variety of short-term jobs. Some
of those who performed some sort of work the day before the interview might not be
permanent workers and their decision may not be based on wages, but short term
opportunities. Similarly, part of the di⁄erence may re￿ ect the involvement of children
in the family business, particularly farming. Labor activities of this kind might not
have as strong an e⁄ect on schooling as other, more stable, formal activities.
8 Family Restrictions and Changes in the Gap
The second part of the theory focuses on changes in the gap within families as
constraints are imposed. Equations (2) and (3) show how families alter the time
allocation of their children when faced with constraints on borrowing or transfers.
Equation (2) in our framework states that families, even under credit constraints,
allocate their children￿ s time according to children￿ s wages and returns to schooling.
This was partly addressed when we considered the family ￿xed e⁄ect model in section
6. We look further here and compare families in our sample who have debt with those
who do not. In this case, rather than looking at credit constraints, which we cannot
measure directly, we look at the use of the debt by a family and its consequences for
their children.
On the other hand, equation (3) states that for families who do not anticipate
making intergenerational transfers to their children, the ￿rst order condition is subject
to an additional distortion which is larger for the less valued child (if that is the case)
or for the child whose future consumption is higher. If there is no parental preference
for a speci￿c gender (i.e. the delta coe¢ cient in equation (3) is constant across
children within households), we anticipate that the daughter￿ s labor supply will be
distorted more since, she would, in the absence of the constraint, work less and study
more. Put di⁄erently, in the absence of transfers to adult children, parents cannot
compensate their boys for the loss of future human capital, from their greater laborChildLabor page 21
supply and therefore demand more labor from girls than they would otherwise. Even
more interesting, gender preferences does not matter for the unconstrained families.
Empirically, families more able to make future transfers should have a wider gender
gap.
Following this line, we construct a series of variables designed to capture how re-
stricted families are, and interact these with a female dummy in the family ￿xed e⁄ect
speci￿cation. We are aware that these measures are quite imperfect, but nevertheless
we think they can give us insight into the decision process within poor families.
We proxy the ability to make future transfers to adult children by dummies for
having large animals (cows, horses, donkeys, pigs or goats) or small animals (chickens,
rabbits or ducks). Additionally, we interact the female dummy with a dummy for
whether the family has any debts or if it took a loan when the family house was
purchased. This is intended to proxy for access to credit markets. According to the
theory, there should not be any di⁄erence in the gender gap between households with
and without credit constraint, so the coe¢ cient on the interaction between gender
and the proxy for credit constraint should not be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
If a rural family has a stock of capital related to their working children￿ s tasks
(most boys in rural areas are involved in agricultural activities), they can increase
the relative labor time of boys and compensate them in the future with some of
that stock. Therefore, the coe¢ cient on this variable interacted with female in the
labor supply equation should be negative and signi￿cant (i.e. gender gap is higher
for unconstrained families), as they will be able compensate boys in the future for
working today. We do not claim that the goods a family has today represent a direct
measure of the transfers the parents intend to leave to their children tomorrow, but
they are certainly positively correlated.
Finally, we include a dummy variable for whether the family owns the house it
lives in, and whether the value of the house and the land net of mortgage is positive
or negative. We do not have an a priori expectation of the sign of the coe¢ cient on
this variable. Families may consider their house as a possible stock to leave to their
children, but it may also be a source of collateral, and thus an indicator of credit.
Table 6 shows the coe¢ cient on the interaction terms with the female dummy in
the labor supply equation. As elsewhere in this paper, the top panel is the model
for the labor participation rate and the lower panel presents the results for hours ofChildLabor page 22
work the day before the interview. Conclusions are fairly consistent if we include each
coe¢ cient alone (left panel) or all together in the speci￿cation (right panel). Again, as
boys work more than girls and are more likely to receive farm stock, families with no
animals (more restricted) should have a smaller gender gap than do households with
animals. Consequently, the female dummy interacted with the animal dummy should
be negative. This is presented in the ￿rst two rows of each panel. For both large
and small animals, the female interacted coe¢ cient is negative and signi￿cant for the
entire sample, although the main e⁄ect is in the rural areas. This means that families
with animals show a greater gender gap in labor than those with no animals, i.e., more
restricted families choose the time allocation of their children more homogeneously.
One concern is that as families have more animals, boys would tend to work more
on their family farms. Therefore, in our rural sample we exclude those children who
consider themselves as family workers and those whose occupation was working on a
family farm. Even so, as the main activity is agricultural (90% of rural boys work on
a farm), animals are a valuable asset, especially for working children in the future.
The e⁄ect is mainly in terms of labor participation, rather than intensity. For hours
worked, the interaction terms, female and animals, are negative and signi￿cant for
the whole sample but insigni￿cant when we look at rural and urban areas separately.
The data presented in this section provide evidence in support of the theory related
to constraints faced by poor families. Once we control for children￿ s wages, the gender
gap is independent of our measures of credit. This indicates that household use
debts to smooth family consumption but access to credit does not modify the relative
allocation of their children￿ s time. On the other hand, rural families, at least, can
use future transfers to their children, to o⁄set inequalities that arise if they exploit
their children￿ s comparative advantage. As a result, rural families with animals have
a larger gender gap in work than those households with none.
9 Conclusions
Imperfect capital markets and poverty are well known determinants of high levels
of child labor in developing countries. Less work has been done on the determinants
of di⁄erences in child labor within poor households. Using a survey of poor families
in Colombia we ￿nd that girls have a higher school attendance rate than boys while
boys have a higher labor force participation rate than girls.ChildLabor page 23
Our theory model extends Baland and Robinson (2000) to a family with two
children. We show that access to credit decreases the level of labor for both children,
but gender di⁄erences can still be explained, as the case of unconstrained families, by
wages for child labor and by the return to schooling. Higher wages for boys encourage
them to work.
A child who works today will tend to have a lower income tomorrow (as educational
attainment is lower). Parents can make transfers to their adult children to compensate
them for this loss. The son, for instance, works as a child and receives some resources
from his parent as an adult. In contrast, the daughter attends school. In a sense,
the son earns money the daughter would otherwise have to earn to provide current
consumption, and receives compensation as an adult. If the parents are poor enough
that future compensation is not possible, both children work, and the di⁄erences
between the boy and girl are smaller. Consistent with this prediction, even among
families whose son does not work on the family farm, the within family gender gap
is higher among those with animalsChildLabor page 24
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School Work Domestic School Work Domestic School Work Domestic
All 0.76 0.24 0.31 0.89 0.13 0.28 0.60 0.36 0.34
(0.43) (0.43) (0.46) (0.32) (0.34) (0.45) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47)
15266 15389 15389 8618 8603 8603 6648 6786 6786
All boys 0.73 0.33 0.20 0.87 0.19 0.21 0.55 0.51 0.20
(0.45) (0.47) (0.40) (0.33) (0.39) (0.41) (0.50) (0.50) (0.40)
8227 8306 8306 4547 4544 4544 3680 3762 3762
All girls 0.80 0.12 0.43 0.91 0.07 0.36 0.67 0.19 0.52
(0.40) (0.33) (0.49) (0.29) (0.25) (0.48) (0.47) (0.39) (0.50)
7039 7083 7083 4071 4059 4059 2968 3024 3024
All Urban 0.81 0.20 0.28 0.91 0.11 0.25 0.68 0.30 0.31
(0.39) (0.40) (0.45) (0.28) (0.31) (0.43) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46)
7303 7348 7348 4065 4059 4059 3238 3289 3289
All boys Urban 0.77 0.27 0.18 0.89 0.15 0.17 0.62 0.42 0.18
(0.42) (0.44) (0.38) (0.31) (0.36) (0.38) (0.49) (0.49) (0.39)
3867 3894 3894 2110 2110 2110 1757 1784 1784
All girls Urban 0.86 0.11 0.39 0.94 0.06 0.34 0.76 0.17 0.46
(0.35) (0.32) (0.49) (0.25) (0.24) (0.47) (0.43) (0.38) (0.50)
3436 3454 3454 1955 1949 1949 1481 1505 1505
All rural 0.72 0.27 0.33 0.87 0.16 0.31 0.53 0.42 0.37
(0.45) (0.45) (0.47) (0.34) (0.36) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
7963 8041 8041 4553 4544 4544 3410 3497 3497
All boys rural 0.69 0.39 0.23 0.85 0.23 0.24 0.49 0.58 0.21
(0.46) (0.49) (0.42) (0.35) (0.42) (0.43) (0.50) (0.49) (0.41)
4360 4412 4412 2437 2434 2434 1923 1978 1978
All girls rural 0.75 0.13 0.47 0.88 0.07 0.38 0.58 0.21 0.58
(0.43) (0.34) (0.50) (0.33) (0.26) (0.49) (0.49) (0.41) (0.49)
3603 3629 3629 2116 2110 2110 1487 1519 1519
All 2.65 0.89 1.13 3.06 0.42 1.05 2.14 1.47 1.22
(3.19) (2.44) (1.60) (3.17) (1.59) (1.44) (3.14) (3.08) (1.78)
16615 16615 16615 9165 9165 9165 7450 7450 7450
All boys 2.51 1.31 0.77 2.95 0.62 0.80 1.97 2.15 0.73
(3.14) (2.85) (1.27) (3.14) (1.94) (1.22) (3.05) (3.50) (1.33)
8788 8788 8788 4830 4830 4830 3958 3958 3958
All girls 2.81 0.41 1.53 3.19 0.18 1.34 2.33 0.70 1.77
(3.24) (1.73) (1.83) (3.20) (1.02) (1.61) (3.22) (2.29) (2.03)
7827 7827 7827 4335 4335 4335 3492 3492 3492
All Urban 2.73 0.68 1.00 3.05 0.34 0.93 2.35 1.08 1.08
(3.22) (2.20) (1.46) (3.17) (1.51) (1.32) (3.24) (2.75) (1.60)
8096 8096 8096 4401 4401 4401 3695 3695 3695
All boys Urban 2.55 0.97 0.68 2.90 0.49 0.68 2.13 1.57 0.67
(3.16) (2.58) (1.19) (3.14) (1.82) (1.13) (3.14) (3.18) (1.26)
4198 4198 4198 2290 2290 2290 1908 1908 1908
All girls Urban 2.92 0.37 1.35 3.23 0.17 1.21 2.58 0.58 1.51
(3.28) (1.64) (1.63) (3.20) (1.02) (1.45) (3.33) (2.11) (1.80)
3898 3898 3898 2111 2111 2111 1787 1787 1787
All rural 2.56 1.08 1.25 3.05 0.48 1.16 1.94 1.84 1.35
(3.16) (2.62) (1.72) (3.17) (1.66) (1.54) (3.02) (3.33) (1.92)
8519 8519 8519 4764 4764 4764 3755 3755 3755
All boys rural 2.47 1.61 0.85 2.97 0.74 0.90 1.84 2.68 0.78
(3.11) (3.05) (1.34) (3.14) (2.03) (1.29) (2.97) (3.69) (1.39)
4590 4590 4590 2540 2540 2540 2050 2050 2050
All girls rural 2.67 0.46 1.72 3.13 0.18 1.46 2.07 0.82 2.05
(3.20) (1.82) (1.99) (3.21) (1.02) (1.74) (3.09) (2.46) (2.22)
3929 3929 3929 2224 2224 2224 1705 1705 1705
First number is the mean, second is the standard deviation, third is the number of observations
Table 1. Rates of participation (weighted means)
Intensity: hours of each activity day before interview (weighted means)
All children 10 to 17 All children 10 to 13 All children 14 to 17ChildLabor page 27
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max
Ever work 8301 0.335 0.472 0 1 7083 0.159 0.366 0 1
age at first work 2710 12.2 2.448 3 17 1110 13.0 2.16 6 17
Hours work/wk 1290 38.79 17.51 0 120 353 41.91 21.04 0 105
Months work last yr 1267 8.107 4.28 0 12 328 6.291 4.616 0 12
Wage/hr 1014 829.9 692.2 8.33 4000 287 621.7 724.8 5 4000
Reads 8239 0.915 0.278 0 1 7046 0.944 0.229 0 1
Writes 8239 0.923 0.266 0 1 7043 0.952 0.214 0 1
Grade now 5956 4.923 2.366 0 19 5618 5.506 2.441 0 17
Didn't go Sch/lastmth 5948 0.259 0.438 0 1 5603 0.225 0.417 0 1
Days didn't go Sch 1503 3.281 3.704 0 30 1301 3.274 5.701 0 99
Reason for no school
at all
High Costs 2186 0.544 0.498 0 1 1354 0.65 0.477 0 1
House duties 2183 0.173 0.378 0 1 1351 0.184 0.387 0 1
Work 2183 0.25 0.433 0 1 1349 0.132 0.338 0 1
No school near 2183 0.065 0.247 0 1 1350 0.093 0.29 0 1
Sch not open 2183 0.016 0.125 0 1 1350 0.013 0.115 0 1
No spots in school 2183 0.011 0.104 0 1 1350 0.012 0.107 0 1
Fail admision 2183 0.008 0.09 0 1 1349 0.00 0.046 0 1
Expelled/fail 2183 0.037 0.189 0 1 1348 0.024 0.153 0 1
did not like study 2185 0.40 0.49 0 1 1349 0.22 0.414 0 1
did not like school 2181 0.05 0.217 0 1 1350 0.046 0.21 0 1
Parents 2182 0.017 0.13 0 1 1351 0.024 0.155 0 1
Sick 2183 0.039 0.193 0 1 1350 0.065 0.246 0 1
Disabled 2183 0.026 0.158 0 1 1351 0.036 0.187 0 1
Other 2179 0.141 0.348 0 1 1354 0.179 0.384 0 1
Preschool ever 7938 0.423 0.494 0 1 6887 0.464 0.499 0 1
Boys Girls
Table 2. Descriptive StatisticsChildLabor page 28
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Major activity, week before the interview for those who have worked (10-17 years old)
Work 1,222 44.79 310 27.65 399 35.69 119 23.33 823 51.12 191 31.26
Didn't work&have job 35 1.28 10 0.89 7 0.63 2 0.39 28 1.74 8 1.31
Incapacitaded 3 0.11 1 0.09 2 0.18 - - 1 0.06 1 0.16
Look for job 81 2.97 11 0.98 49 4.38 7 1.37 32 1.99 4 0.65
House duties 214 7.84 391 34.88 92 8.23 148 29.02 122 7.58 243 39.77
Study 803 29.44 342 30.51 383 34.26 199 39.02 420 26.09 143 23.4
Other activity 370 13.56 56 5.00 186 16.64 35 6.86 184 11.43 21 3.44
Total 2,728 100 1,121 100 1,118 100 510 100 1,610 100 611 100
Activity for those whose main activity was working (10-17 years old)
Employed 736 59.31 128 40.13 273 67.74 49 40.5 463 55.25 79 39.9
Maid 6 0.48 121 37.93 4 0.99 52 42.98 2 0.24 69 34.85
Self employed 245 19.74 33 10.34 91 22.58 14 11.57 154 18.38 19 9.6
Boss/Partner 8 0.64 - - - - - - 8 0.95 - -
Family work no pay 246 19.82 37 11.60 35 8.68 6 4.96 211 25.18 31 15.66
Total 1,241 100.00 319 100.00 403 100.00 121 100 838 100.00 198 100
Place of work for children whose main activity was work (10 and more)
Store/office of boss 91 7.91 36 12.00 75 20.72 20 18.69 16 2.03 16 8.29
Store/office own 3 0.26 - - 3 0.83 - - - - - -
House-own 13 1.13 29 9.67 4 1.1 6 5.61 9 1.14 23 11.92
House-other 44 3.83 151 50.33 26 7.18 64 59.81 18 2.28 87 45.08
Street-movile 72 6.26 10 3.33 54 14.92 10 9.35 18 2.28 - -
Street-fixed 16 1.39 1 0.33 12 3.31 1 0.93 4 0.51 - -
Stand 5 0.43 2 0.67 5 1.38 2 1.87 - - - -
Door to door 4 0.35 1 0.33 1 0.28 - - 3 0.38 1 0.52
In a vehicle 32 2.78 1 0.33 19 5.25 1 0.93 13 1.65 - -
Mine 10 0.87 - - 1 0.28 - - 9 1.14 - -
Construction 12 1.04 - - 11 3.04 - - 1 0.13 - -
Farm-own 197 17.13 19 6.33 13 3.59 - - 184 23.35 19 9.84
Farm-other 651 56.61 50 16.67 138 38.12 3 2.8 513 65.1 47 24.35
Total 1,150 100.00 300 100.00 362 100 107 100 788 100 193 100
Reason missed school last month (for those in school)
Sick 813 55.76 798 63.18 403 57.49 410 54.16 418 65.31 380 61
Didn't want to go 157 10.77 86 6.81 89 12.7 68 8.98 41 6.41 45 7.22
Work 38 2.61 11 0.87 11 1.57 27 3.57 5 0.78 6 0.96
Work at home 78 5.35 54 4.28 14 2 64 8.45 9 1.41 45 7.22
Transportation 16 1.10 4 0.32 3 0.43 13 1.72 - - 4 0.64
No money 69 4.73 58 4.59 41 5.85 28 3.7 44 6.88 14 2.25
No class 70 4.80 64 5.07 29 4.14 41 5.42 21 3.28 43 6.9
Other 217 14.88 188 14.89 111 15.83 106 14 102 15.94 86 13.8
Total 1,458 100.00 1,263 100.00 701 100 757 100 640 100 623 100
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Urban Rural All
Table 3. Occupational DistributionChildLabor page 29
Age only as control All 10 to 13 >13 All 10 to 13 >13 All 10 to 13 >13
Education 0.070 0.033 0.117 0.087 0.043 0.137 0.048 0.021 0.085
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.012)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.016)** (0.009)** (0.010)* (0.017)**
Work -0.206 -0.122 -0.310 -0.158 -0.088 -0.240 -0.244 -0.150 -0.367
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)**
Domestic duties 0.226 0.148 0.323 0.215 0.162 0.277 0.241 0.141 0.371
(0.007)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.010)** (0.014)** (0.015)**
All controls
Education 0.064 0.031 0.103 0.080 0.040 0.126 0.045 0.022 0.074
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.009)** (0.010)* (0.016)**
Work -0.201 -0.120 -0.301 -0.148 -0.082 -0.236 -0.245 -0.152 -0.365
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)**
Domestic duties 0.230 0.150 0.330 0.222 0.176 0.277 0.242 0.138 0.379
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.013)** (0.016)** (0.010)** (0.014)** (0.015)**
All 10 to 13 >13 All 10 to 13 >13 All 10 to 13 >13
Female 0.064 0.032 0.101 0.08 0.04 0.126 0.045 0.022 0.074
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.009)** (0.010)* (0.016)**
Age -0.073 -0.043 -0.097 -0.062 -0.026 -0.102 -0.083 -0.058 -0.09
(0.002)** (0.003)** (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.004)** (0.007)** (0.003)** (0.005)** (0.008)**
Region east -0.105 -0.043 -0.176 -0.059 -0.006 -0.112 -0.129 -0.063 -0.215
(0.010)** (0.011)** (0.018)** (0.014)** -0.015 (0.026)** (0.016)** (0.017)** (0.028)**
Region central -0.112 -0.055 -0.181 -0.136 -0.069 -0.21 -0.085 -0.046 -0.133
(0.009)** (0.010)** (0.017)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.023)** (0.014)** (0.015)** (0.026)**
Region pacific -0.114 -0.057 -0.185 -0.162 -0.099 -0.223 -0.075 -0.02 -0.154
(0.012)** (0.012)** (0.021)** (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.032)** (0.016)** -0.018 (0.029)**
N households 0.014 -0.005 0.044 -0.004 -0.031 0.039 0.047 0.052 0.044
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017)* (0.010) (0.010)** (0.018)* (0.021)* (0.022)* (0.042)
N rooms 0.015 0.006 0.026 0.023 0.005 0.037 0.007 0.007 0.009
(0.004)** (0.005) (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006) (0.010)** (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Fridge 0.041 0.029 0.058 0.034 0.031 0.041 0.046 0.025 0.067
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.013)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.017)* (0.012)** (0.013) (0.021)**
Decision Sch mom 0.051 0.062 0.039 0.046 0.031 0.08 0.056 0.088 0.019
(0.012)** (0.013)** (0.023) (0.018)** (0.018) (0.033)* (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.031)
Decision Sch both 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.028 0.002 0.073 0.041 0.059 0.019
parent (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.034)* (0.017)* (0.018)** (0.031)
Head elementary 0.03 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.023 0.041 0.027 0.032 0.019
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.013)* (0.011)** (0.011)* (0.019)* (0.011)* (0.012)** (0.019)
Head secondary 0.089 0.057 0.139 0.08 0.046 0.131 0.124 0.073 0.219
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.023)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.028)** (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.044)**
Head college 0.107 0.061 0.233 0.103 0.039 0.257 0.18 0.138 0.289
(0.043)* (0.042) (0.088)** (0.048)* (0.046) (0.098)** (0.083)* (0.083) (0.184)
Partner elementary 0.037 0.025 0.047 0.029 0.016 0.047 0.037 0.028 0.049
(0.008)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.012)* -0.013 (0.022)* (0.012)** (0.013)* (0.021)*
Partner secondary 0.083 0.061 0.113 0.061 0.051 0.078 0.118 0.077 0.18
(0.014)** (0.014)** (0.027)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.032)* (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.051)**
Partner college 0.125 0.059 0.131 0.08 0.071 0.051 0.122 -0.063 0.263
(0.045)** (0.060) (0.068) (0.047) (0.061) (0.073) (0.119) (0.147) (0.188)
N children 0-6 -0.03 -0.02 -0.044 -0.026 -0.019 -0.033 -0.034 -0.021 -0.051
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.009)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.009)**
N adults male -0.013 -0.002 -0.024 -0.015 -0.012 -0.022 -0.006 0.005 -0.018
(0.004)** (0.005) (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.006) (0.010)* (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
N adults female 0.019 0.016 0.02 0.019 0.014 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.02
(0.006)** (0.007)* (0.010)* (0.007)** (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Birth order -0.009 0 -0.042 -0.009 0.003 -0.048 -0.012 -0.004 -0.035
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012)** (0.007) (0.007) (0.016)** (0.007) (0.007) (0.017)*
Partner incapacitaded -0.163 -0.218 -0.093 0.003 -0.078 0.171 -0.223 -0.281 -0.155
(0.051)** (0.055)** (0.090) (0.102) (0.095) (0.217) (0.062)** (0.070)** (0.106)
shock: sick person -0.044 -0.026 -0.07 -0.047 -0.033 -0.067 -0.044 -0.022 -0.063
in household (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.022)** (0.012)** -0.013 (0.021)**
shock: fire 0.08 0.065 0.102 0.076 0.059 0.073 0.095 0.076 0.123
(0.015)** (0.015)** (0.029)** (0.023)** (0.021)** (0.047) (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.038)**
Observations 15127 8549 6578 7224 4023 3201 7903 4526 3377
R-squared 0.22 0.09 0.17 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.23 0.1 0.16
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4. Raw Gender Gap (Female Dummy). Participation rate specification
All Urban Rural
Table 4a. School Attendance. Controls Included
All Urban RuralChildLabor page 30
All 10 to 13 >13 All 10 to 13 >13
Age -0.081 -0.047 -0.103 -0.063 -0.04 -0.089
(0.002)** (0.005)** (0.008)** (0.002)** (0.004)** (0.008)**
Region east -0.137 -0.074 -0.205 -0.067 -0.002 -0.152
(0.015)** (0.016)** (0.026)** (0.014)** (0.015) (0.027)**
Region central -0.135 -0.076 -0.207 -0.088 -0.026 -0.153
(0.013)** (0.014)** (0.024)** (0.013)** (0.013) (0.025)**
Region pacific -0.12 -0.069 -0.185 -0.108 -0.042 -0.182
(0.017)** (0.018)** (0.029)** (0.016)** (0.017)* (0.031)**
N households 0.022 -0.015 0.081 0.003 -0.003 0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.027)** (0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
N rooms 0.008 -0.004 0.025 0.026 0.02 0.03
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)* (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.011)**
Fridge 0.035 0.025 0.048 0.048 0.032 0.069
(0.011)** (0.012)* (0.019)** (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.019)**
Decision Sch mom 0.024 0.057 -0.025 0.085 0.071 0.119
(0.017) (0.019)** (0.031) (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.034)**
Decision Sch both 0.027 0.029 0.026 0.05 0.045 0.06
parent (0.017) (0.019) (0.031) (0.017)** (0.017)** -0.034
Head elementary 0.017 0.004 0.036 0.046 0.058 0.034
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011)** (0.011)** -0.02
Head secondary 0.066 0.028 0.139 0.109 0.09 0.146
(0.018)** (0.019) (0.033)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.033)**
Head college 0.113 0.001 0.423 0.149 0.146 0.211
(0.071) (0.068) (0.162)** (0.053)** (0.053)** (0.104)*
Partner elementary 0.07 0.057 0.074 -0.006 -0.014 0.01
(0.012)** (0.013)** (0.021)** (0.012) (0.012) (0.023)
Partner secondary 0.122 0.113 0.139 0.034 0.001 0.092
(0.020)** (0.021)** (0.039)** (0.019) (0.020) (0.036)*
Partner college 0.112 0.088 0.078 0.118 0.022 0.15
(0.068) (0.093) (0.103) (0.058)* (0.076) (0.090)
N children 0-3 -0.03 -0.019 -0.038 -0.031 -0.02 -0.051
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.012)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.013)**
N children 4-6 -0.026 -0.012 -0.044 -0.032 -0.03 -0.033
(0.007)** (0.008) (0.013)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.014)*
N adults male -0.011 -0.005 -0.018 -0.017 0 -0.033
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)** (0.007) (0.010)**
N adults female 0.031 0.017 0.041 0.001 0.018 -0.012
(0.008)** (0.009) (0.014)** (0.008) (0.009)* (0.014)
shock: sick person -0.036 -0.025 -0.049 -0.058 -0.025 -0.104
in household (0.012)** (0.013) (0.021)* (0.012)** (0.012)* (0.023)**
shock: fire 0.081 0.075 0.103 0.076 0.051 0.107
(0.021)** (0.022)** (0.040)* (0.021)** (0.021)* (0.041)**
Observations 8151 4513 3638 6976 4036 2940
R-squared 0.23 0.1 0.17 0.2 0.1 0.18
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4.b. School Attendance by gender.
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All 10 to 13 14to17 Urban Urban10 Urban14 Rural Rural10 Rural14
Raw 0.07 0.033 0.117 0.087 0.043 0.137 0.048 0.021 0.085
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.012)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.016)** (0.009)** (0.010)* (0.017)**
Raw FE 0.055 0.034 0.088 0.066 0.035 0.104 0.045 0.031 0.074
(0.008)** (0.011)** (0.018)** (0.011)** (0.013)** (0.026)** (0.011)** (0.017) (0.024)**
OLS 0.025 0.01 0.05 0.048 0.02 0.086 0.008 0.002 0.023
wages (0.007)** (0.007) (0.013)** (0.009)** (0.010)* (0.017)** (0.010) (0.011) (0.018)
FE 0.029 0.014 0.065 0.042 0.013 0.068 0.02 0.011 0.062
wage (0.009)** (0.013) (0.020)** (0.012)** (0.016) (0.031)* (0.013) (0.020) (0.027)*
N 15266 8618 6648 7303 4065 3238 7963 4553 3410
Raw 0.294 0.241 0.363 0.39 0.332 0.446 0.181 0.146 0.234
(0.049)** (0.066)** (0.072)** (0.071)** (0.096)** (0.105)** (0.067)** (0.092) (0.098)*
Raw FE 0.229 0.235 0.258 0.21 0.218 0.226 0.245 0.244 0.285
(0.047)** (0.072)** (0.097)** (0.066)** (0.099)* -0.146 (0.067)** (0.103)* (0.130)*
OLS 0.07 0.035 0.089 0.108 0.037 0.168 0.038 0.01 0.016
wages (0.053) (0.073) (0.078) (0.078) (0.107) (0.114) (0.072) (0.101) (0.106)
FE 0.106 0.124 0.095 0.099 0.129 0.01 0.113 0.137 0.154
wage (0.055) (0.086) (0.114) (0.078) (0.123) (0.177) (0.076) (0.122) (0.148)
N 16615 9165 7450 8096 4401 3695 8519 4764 3755
Raw -0.206 -0.122 -0.31 -0.158 -0.088 -0.24 -0.244 -0.15 -0.367
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.015)**
Raw FE -0.208 -0.144 -0.315 -0.148 -0.096 -0.211 -0.26 -0.184 -0.404
(0.008)** (0.013)** (0.018)** (0.012)** (0.018)** (0.026)** (0.012)** (0.018)** (0.025)**
OLS -0.131 -0.074 -0.205 -0.095 -0.046 -0.158 -0.166 -0.098 -0.253
wages (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.016)** (0.009)** (0.011)** (0.016)**
FE -0.161 -0.114 -0.261 -0.1 -0.042 -0.157 -0.211 -0.167 -0.338
wage (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.013)** (0.021)* (0.031)** (0.013)** (0.021)** (0.027)**
N 15389 8603 6786 7348 4059 3289 8041 4544 3497
Raw -0.898 -0.443 -1.458 -0.625 -0.317 -0.982 -1.123 -0.548 -1.871
(0.036)** (0.033)** (0.069)** (0.047)** (0.045)** (0.088)** (0.054)** (0.047)** (0.104)**
Raw FE -1.047 -0.554 -1.836 -0.677 -0.243 -1.267 -1.389 -0.836 -2.354
(0.050)** (0.061)** (0.119)** (0.064)** (0.077)** (0.157)** (0.074)** (0.091)** (0.177)**
OLS -0.509 -0.217 -0.889 -0.254 -0.06 -0.486 -0.754 -0.359 -1.307
wages (0.038)** (0.036)** (0.072)** (0.050)** (0.048) (0.091)** (0.056)** (0.052)** (0.110)**
FE -0.779 -0.402 -1.414 -0.412 0.077 -0.882 -1.1 -0.774 -1.834
wage (0.056)** (0.072)** (0.135)** (0.074)** (0.092) (0.184)** (0.083)** (0.108)** (0.195)**
N 16615 9165 7450 8096 4401 3695 8519 4764 3755
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Family Fixed Effect All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
Specification no farm no farm
Wage included
Female*big_animal -0.088 -0.049 -0.061 -0.069 -0.044 -0.046
(0.015)** (0.025) (0.022)** (0.016)** (0.026) (0.023)*
Female*small_animal -0.082 -0.025 -0.096 -0.055 -0.012 -0.081
(0.016)** (0.020) (0.030)** (0.018)** (0.021) (0.032)*
Female*own_house -0.012 -0.025 0.011 -0.024 -0.108 0.015
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.075) (0.113) (0.099)
Female*Positive value house -0.001 0.002 -0.014 0.001 0.003 -0.009
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
Female*debt 0.01 0.021 -0.011 -0.026 -0.088 -0.012
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.074) (0.112) (0.098)
Female*big_animal -0.356 -0.224 -0.112 -0.272 -0.255 -0.05
(0.092)** (0.140) (0.136) (0.100)** (0.146) (0.143)
Female*small_animal -0.331 0.054 -0.35 -0.215 0.115 -0.346
(0.097)** (0.115) (0.187) (0.105)* (0.120) (0.197)
Female*own_house -0.066 -0.11 -0.035 -0.17 0.122 -0.902
(0.100) (0.124) (0.149) (0.451) (0.597) (0.641)
Female*Positive value house 0.087 -0.053 0.272 0.088 -0.049 0.266
(0.098) (0.124) (0.146) (0.098) (0.125) (0.146)
Female*debt 0.056 0.119 -0.017 -0.147 0.237 -0.919
(0.099) (0.123) (0.147) (0.446) (0.592) (0.633)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Labor Intensity
Labor Participation
Each interaction terms included All interaction terms included
Table 6. Coefficient of female interaction terms with goods and financial restriction variables
in a separate specification in one specification